o texto anaiisa as efeitos Ja illflac;ao sabre a capaciuade dos agelltes prevercm preGOs reais, lltili;.:alldo dauos lllicroeconomicas para a Argentina 110 periotio 1000-1902. A cvitiellcia sngere qne a illflaG�lO degraJa a contcl' tcio iufol'Illaciollai dos preGos reais. lvlostra-se que a performance de diversas rcgras de previsao de preGoH teai:..; piora qlIallcio a iuHaGao aUlllCllta. AIelll ciissa, as preGos reais mndam COlll mais freqiiencia e as liqllidaGoes desapareccm. l;.;so lmgere que a inHaGao (pelo menDs a inflac;ao elevada) acarrcta efeitos de �;Orgalli;.:aGao Iudllstl'iar' C01ll11l11cnte ignoraJos em avaliaGoe:-; rnaCl'oecollomicas dos efeitos oa illHaGao.
PalalJ'I'O,,<;HChave: Inflatioll) infonllativelle��, pricing rnleH ) forecasting C6digo JEL: D4, D83, E31, L16
Introduction.
Inflation, we are told, affects the workings of the price system. Friedman (1977) , in his Nobel Lecture, hypothesized that increased volatility of inflation reduces the efficiency of market prices as co ordinators of economic activity via an "increased amount of noise". Fischer (1981) argued that "inflation is associated with relative price variability that is unrelated to relative scarcities and hence leads to misallocations of resources". As Ball and Romer (1992) stress, prices have two 1'Oles: guiding allocations and providing information. Both roles are clearly interwined, and several authors have argued that in flation, by affecting information, worsens the allocation of resources. For example, Reagan and Stultz (1993) argue that price instabil ity raises the costs of contracting and lowers economic efficiency. Huizinga (1993) argues that relative price uncertainty can reduce investment -uncertainty about the net present value of investment projects can make firms reluctant to incur costly, irreversible capital outlays. Tommasi (1994) argues that as current prices become poor predictors of future ones, agents optimally decide to be less informed, and more inefficient transactions occur -for instance, inefficient firms may be able to survive in an environment of price ignorance.
An extensive literature has linked aggregate inflation and infla tion uncertainty with measures of "relative price variability" (RPV).
Cukierman (1983), Marquez and Vining (1984) , and Palerm (1990) survey the "macro" literature, while Weiss (1993) reviews the more recent "micro" findings. That empirical literature used measures of price variability that, although interesting in their own right,l did not directly address the question of the informational content of prices. Prices can be highly variable yet very predictable -and hence very informative.
In this paper, I try to look directly into the informational content of real prices under different inflation regimes. I use microeconomic evidence (grocery prices) from a high-inflation case: Argentina 1990 Argentina -1992 . The evidence favors the view, in Carlton (1982) , that "inflation degrades the informational content of real prices".
Prices are indicators of characteristics of the good and of the seller, which are important because they can affect the ex-post value of today's purchase and the value of repeated purchase from the same supplier. Given that my data set consists of grocery prices I concentrate on the latter, the information that today's prices provide about future prices. Operationally, I study the forecastability of real prices under different inflation regimes. The reader may wonder why is this necessary if we already know that higher infl ations tend to be associated with increased RPV. As stated before, there is not a one to one correspondence between the measures of RPV employed in the literature and the informativeness of prices. Imagine a world in which half the sellers (those located in streets that run North-South) increased their prices by 20% in odd periods, while the other half did so in even periods. Imagine that this pattern has been in place for a long time, and it is hence known by buyers. Then, measured relative price variability will be 10% although the prices observed today will be fully informative about the future. Imagine at the other end that every sellers throws a coin to decide whether or not to increase his nominal price by 10%. In that case RPV will be only 5%, but today's prices will be much less revealing than in the previous example.
The Data.
The data used in this study consist of weekly price quotes from 5 supermarkets within the same neighborhood in the Federal District of Buenos Aires, Argentina, collected by the Secretaria de Comercio. The original sample contained 15 products, from which I selected the 10 with low number of missing values: butter, coffee, flour, laundry detergent, oil, peas, tea, tomato sauce and yerba (a typi cal Argentina beverage, similar to tead). Each good is completely homogeneous across stores, a particular brand/quality; for instance, "coffee" is a particular brand and size of instant coffee. The series run for 46 weeks in 1990 (February-December), two sets of 12 weeks in 1991 (January-April and September-December), and 30 weeks in 1992 (April-November). Statistics for aggregate inflation are pro vided in Table 12 The annual inflation rate in Argentina was of the order of 5000% in 1989 , 1300% in 1990 , 85% in 1991 , and 18% in 1992 . On April 1991 2 I have experilllellteJ using Jiffcrelll constructions for the aggregate price inuex allli fol' inflation: aIle from all inuepe\llient inflation sailiple (frolll Iustituto ue Politica ECollolllica y Social) , anu au at iter lIsiug intrasalllpie uata with CPl weights, without suLslanti\'e changes in the re:mlts. In the paper I reJJort the Jata Ilsing the 1I01l-weighteu intr3s31l1ple measure of inflation. the government adopted a fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. The "Convertibility Law" was the corner-stone of a new and desper ate stabilization program devised to put an end to a history of almost 50 years of rates of inflation well above international standards which climaxed in two hyperinflation accelerations during April-July 1989 and December 1989 -March 1990 In most of the paper I will be looking at the behavior of indi vidual prices across inflation "regimes". I will use average weekly inflation to characterize each period, but in this as in most inflation experiences, inflation variability -and quite likely inflation uncer tainty -are positively correlated to average inflation.3 The "regimes" I use are: February-lVIay 1990 , l'day-August 1990 , August-December 1990 , January-April 1991 , September-December 1991 , and April November 1992 . In exploratory work when I only had the 1990 data (Tommasi 1993), I concluded that it was best to characterize that sample into the three 15-week episodes. The first 15 weeks are clearly distinct, since it is a hyperinflation period. I chose to treat the other two sub periods separately since prices might behave differently right after hyperinflation than when stability is more consolidated. The results of the paper do not change if we use alternative partitions of the 1990 data. With respect to 1991 we did not have many options, as we only had to non-contiguous sets of 12 weeks. We explored partitioning the 1992 data into two subperiods, and the results do not change. It is worth noting at the outset, that the results are not driven by the two hyperinflation episodes. As you will see in Figure 1 , the results are fairly monotonic.
In the next section, I explore the impact of macroeconomic insta bility, as measured by different inflation environments, on the ability of economic agents to forecast future prices, using several forecast rules.
Inflation and the Informativeness of Prices.
The exercise in this section consists on generating a forecast of future prices from past information, and then evaluating how that forecast performs in the different inflation regimes. The Section 3.1 looks at autoregressive models. Section 3.2 uses insights !l'om the literature on costs of price adjustment and uses (S, s) forecasts. Sec tion 3.3 looks at deviations from "warranted" prices and Section 3.'1 compares and summarizes the information from the different forecast rules. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 provide additional information on the "IO" effects of inflation, by looking at the durability of real prices, and at the effect of inflation on the presence of mark-down sales.
Autocorrelations of real prices.
As a first forecast rule, following the literature on consumer re search (Winer, 1986) , we look at an extrapolation of past realprices.4
In the next section we will look at forecast rules that take explicitly into account the intermittent change in nominal prices that emerges from costs of price adj ustment.
Let Pijl. be the price of good ·i and store j at time t. Let PI. la :S;�1 :S}=1 Pi.,jl. be the price index at time t. Also, let Zi.it. -In I};' , be a measure of real price.
<1 Literature Oil conSllmer research generally assllmes (with rcasonaLle elllPirical sllccess) that cons11lncrs extrapolate the past oLsel'veJ pl'ice, aJjnsting for lrcuJ, ill this case aggregate inl-la� tioll. hI most of the aualysis I will Le ass11l11ing kllowleJge of average inflatioll � ill high inHation situations, people tend to Le 'Illite illfot"lncJ aLont the evoilltion of the exchange rate, anJ es� tilnates of aggregate inflation are l"eleaseJ at high frequeucy (that is the reason why the Jata Leing used have Leeu collecteJ). Abo, insofar as price takers have to forecast real prices with imperfect illforlllatioll aLont aggregates, I aUl ignoring; all extra inforlllational Jifficllity ill favor of the hypothesis of this paper: higher in Hat ion envirolllllents make forecasting of real prices very JifHclllt. �dore on this later.
The time series properties of the 50 series Zi,jl, were analyzed by looking at the partial autocorrelations, This suggested describing its behavior by the AR(I) process:"
(1)
Table Al provides the estimated values of p and t-statistics for each product-store pair for each of the 6 episodes, Correlation co efficients tend to be lower in periods of higher inflation, Table 2 summarizes this information, (All the tables in the text are orga nized by ascending order of inflation, rather than chronologically,) As a quick check for significance, I regressed (across the 6 regimes) average p from Table 2 on a constant and inflation, The coeffi cient on infiation is -,047 and the t-statistic is -11 , 08 , significant at the 1 percent leveL
The information in Tables Al and 2 suggests that the higher the aggregate macroeconomic instability (inflation), the harder it is to make predictions about future values of real pricesG 5 The allal : ysis has Leen reproduced llsing richer AR specificatioll):;. The forecast ability is no uetter than the AR (1), and the results across inHatioll regimes are cOllsi):;tellt \VitI! those ill the AR (1) ca'e, 6 A similar finding was reported in T0Il11113Si (HID3, Sectioll 5). There, aside from having a shorter sample, the emphasis was 011 the deviatiOll of tbe price at a particular store \Vitb respect to the product average. Following the searcb literature, I suggested tbat the aLility of Luyers to identify ':low price sellers" was declining ill inflation.
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16 (2) Novembro 1996 Still, the estimate of p provides only information about the slope of a regression of Zijl. on Zijl.-I. It may be the case that a smaller slope does not necessarily mean less information. If agents knew fOT SUTC that the deviation of tomorrow's price from some average price will be exactly 33% of today's deviation, there will be full information in spite p = .33. This suggests looking at the forecast error from such AR(I) rule. To do that, we look at the standard error of the regression (SER) or mean squared forecast error (M SE): The last row in Table 2 presents the average J1I[ S E for each time period (inflation regime). The evidence suggests forecast errors in creasing in the inflation rate, consistent with a negative effect of inflation on information. Regressing average M S E on average infla tion across the 6 regimes, we obtain a coefficient of .01 on inflation, with standard error .004 and t-statistic of 2, 65, significant at the 5 percent level.
Given that all the products were sold in the same stores (super markets), it may be the case that buyers do not care about the prices of individual items, but at the price of a "bundle" they purchase. In that case, what matters is the predictability of the price of the bun dle. To analyze the impact of inflation on the price of a composite commodity, I constructed a price index per store, Pi, and regressed the equivalent of equation (1), now on the composite, as opposed to individual goods. I worked with both a weighted average (using weights from CPI) and unweighted average. I report in Tables A2  and 3 the results for the unweighted bundle; the results with weights are similar. Notice that, not surprisingly, there is much less volatility at the level of "bundle" than at the level of individual product. To some extent, this is just an artifact of aggregation? Once more, the evi dence indicates a worsening of forecasts at higher inflation rates. The regression coefficient of inflation is -.025(.004) for average p and of .0028(.0002) for average 111 SE. t-statistic are -6.96 and 15.77, in both cases highly significant.
(5, s) pricing rules.
So far we have looked at correlations of real prices over time, and at second moments of these linear predictors. Of course, it may be the case that price expectations are formed differently. For instance, stores may follow a particular pricing rule, and consumers may be aware of that and from their expectations accordingly. A sizable the oretical and empirical literature emphasizes the presence of nominal price regidities at the micro economic level (and its implications both at the micro and macro level)8 The most common pricing rule in the literature, is the (5, s ) pricing policy, analogous to the solution to the dynamic inventory problem (Scarf (1959) ). 9 Firms set nom inal prices to induce an initial real price S, and then let inflation erode its real price up to s, before changing the nominal price again. The bounds are chosen to minimize the loss of being away from an optimal real price plus the cost of the nominal change. We assume in what follows that consumers are aware of those pricing policies, and hence we look at (S, s) forecast rules.
Define real prices as Rijt = Pijt! Pt. We will be assuming that for each period (inflation regime), seller j selects the bounds Sij and Sij within which the real price of product ij will be allowed to fluctuate. In constructing consumers' estimates, I assume that they know or estimate the bounds to be the order statistics Sij = max(Rijt), and Sij = max(Rijt) for each period under analysis.lo Also, I assume that consumers (and firms) know the realization of aggregate inflation at any point in time. This is obviously not true, but explicit consideration of the difficulties of predicting real prices in an environment of aggregate uncertainty could only strenghten the point of the paper: the higher the macro uncertainty, the harder it is to forecast real prices.
-(S, s ) rules with one price change.
Bonomo (1994) shows that (S, s) policies are optimal only when all the shocks are positive and they are very close to optimal when 9 Sheshinski and Wi", (1977) and (1983) are the class ical reference. Olplin and Spulher (1987) , Caballero and Engel (1991) , and Caplin and Leahy (1991) address the question of aggre gation; i.e., the behavior of the aggr egate price level and aggregate output in economies populated by firrrs following (S, s) pricing policies. Cecchetti (1986), Lacl1 and Tsiddon (1992), and Fisher and Konieczny (1993) are empirical studies of (S, s ) policies at the microeconomic level. Cec chetti (1985) provides a rrethodology for rreasuring frequency of price changes in order to test the relevance of ass uming prices to be set for discrete periods of tirre at overlapping intervals.
10 Se e Flinn and Heclamn (1982) for the fast convergence properties of these estimators. Other
EStimations of S i j and S ij, such as minimization of rrean squared error ¥B"e explored, without substantial changes in the results.
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the average inflation rate is large relative to its variability. The literature has tended to use (S, s) rules as an approximation to op timal rules in more general cases (see Caplin and Sheshinski 1987 and Blanchard 1990) . Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Ferreira (1995) suggest that (S, s) rules are good approximations to the behavior of prices in inflationary environments (for the cases of Israel and Brasil, respectively) .
Imagine that sellers are following an (S, s) rule, with bounds chosen as a function of the inflation ratc, 11 and that consumers know the average inflation rate. In this section We assume that (consumers from their forecast believing that) nominal prices change at most once between observations. In the next section we extend to more general forecasts.
The forecast will consider two possibilities. If inflation this pe riod was quite low or if last real price observation was quite high, we except the nominal price to be the same of last observation, and hence the real price will be Rijt-I (Pt-I/ Pt). If inflation was high enough or last observation low enough, we except a nominal price change. Let T E (t -1, t) be the exact moment at which the real price hits s, so that and At that moment, the nominal price is adjusted to induce a real price S. From T to t, it depreciates by (PT/ PI} Hence So that the forecast or real price will be given by
The Mean Squared forecast Errors
and Mean Average forecast Errors (a criterion less sensitive to out liers)
t from forecast rule (3), were computed for each ij, for each inflation regime. Table 4 summarizes the MSE and MAE information. The MSEs and lVIAEs of each product/store were normalized by the mean (hence expressed in percentage, unit free, terms) before averaging. Analogous to the findings of previous sections, forecast errors are increasing in the inflation rate. Inflation is signifi cant in the explanation of average MSE, at the 1 percent level (t-statistic 6.67).
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The results of Table ' 1 can be criticized on the grounds that an (S, s) algorithm that allows for only one price change will tend to induce a bias to excessive errors in cases of very high inflation. (If weekly inflation is larger than the percentage difference between S and s, stores will change prices more than once a week, and hence the errol' hom forecast rule (3) will be too large).
To account for that possibility, recursive versions of (3), allowing for 2 and 3 price changes were studied. (Given that the lowest (S, s) range was of the order of 20% and that the highest inflation was of 40%, more than 3 price changes seemed unnecessary). Those rules did not represent a substantial improvement over the simpler one, and the results also showed errors to be larger in episodes of higher inflation. 1 2 One could also argue that even if firms were following textbook (S, s) rules, it seems unlikely that price taking agents (buyers) in these markets will go over such sophisticated computations. In order to compare the performance of relatively simpler rules, the following option was explored: 12 (S, s) with "bounded rationality" rule: If a first stage, 1tSe forecast Tule (3). If the forecast R is greater than or equal to si. i' use that forecast . Otherwise, forecast R to be the mid-point of the band, (Si . i + Sij )/2 .
Notice that a recmsi ve versiOll of (3) is equi valent to nde that allowfl for auy lllllllbel' of adjustll1ents. Bonomo and Xajberg ( 1 993) show that this HlO\'e general rule l<;:
when n = {max z E Z+: (s/S)z::;: (Pr/Pt.)}. For largevalues ofinflatiol1,this rule did worse than the rille we pt�sel1t below.
The MSEs and MAEs from this rule for the 50 product/stores were computed. The unit-free averages are reported in Table 5 . Once once, predictive power is lost at higher inflation rates. The t-statistic for inflation in the regression explaining MSE is 8.12. Com paring with Table 4 , this rule does a little better at very high infla tion. I discuss a more general comparison across forecast rules in Section 3.4.13 3.3. The excess variability of relative prices.14 Excess price variability is likely to have negative effects on the workings of the price system for at least two reasons, relating to the two roles of prices: allocation and information. First, the alloca tional role of prices is affected if prices are away from fundamentals. Second, if current prices are less revealing about future ones (i.e.
13 Notice that I have used only one sided (S, s ) rules. It is pcss ible that firm can be following tmrsided rules. The likelihood of that depends on tbe relative importance of the oommn upward drift vis-a-vis the importance of idicsyncratic shocks and poss ibility of deflation. Intuitively, it is lIDre likely that firm fcllow tmrsided rules during episodes of low inflation. In that case , %' estimates of forecast errors night be upward biased in the low infl ation cases, working against %' hypothesis.
14 I am indebted to Stauley Fischer for suggest ions that lead to this section.
Revista de Econometria
16 (2) Novembro 1996 its informational role is affected), further distortions arise Romer 1992, and Tommasi 1994) . Most of the paper so far has con centrated on the second point: infiation diminishes the information about future real prices contained in current ones. In this section, I present a measure of the deviation of real prices at any point in time from their "correct" level.
According to Fischer (1986) , in order to assess the (negative)
impact of infiation-induced price variability on the workings of the price system, one wants a measure of divergence of the price of the good from its "correct" price. In order to construct such a measure, I assumed the "warranted" price for each good/store in each episode to be the average Ri. i = I: Ri. itlT of that period. From there, I
constructed as measure of excess price variability, the coefficient of variation of Ri, it around R,: ,i' The same exercise is performed at the level of product average Ri (as opposed to product/store Ri. i)' The numbers are provided in Table A3 and summarized in Table 6 . Not surprisingly, excess price variability is increasing in the in fiation rate. Regressing CVij on the average infiation and a constant, the infiation coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level (t of 11.35).
The same is true for CVi, with a t-statistic of 4.01.
I have reproduced this exercise using as alternative proxies for the "warranted" price: (i) the average price of the good across stores in that period, and (ii) that average corrected for the average markup charged by each store. The results are the same.
Comparison of forecast rules.
In turns out that the measure of excess variability of relative prices CVi. i is equivalent to the !VISE of a forecast rule where the price consumers expect to find at any point in time is the period average Ri.i' Hence, we have reported 4 different forecast rules. In this section, I provide a brief comparison across forecast rules. Table 7 summarizes the averages of .MSE for the 4 forecast rules in the 6 episodes under analysis. Table 4 Ss+br: % !VISE from Table 5 Ct. : CVi.i from Table 6 Ss ( The information, plotted in Figure 1 shows that all the forecast rules perform worse at higher inflation. In terms of relative perfor mance, AR(l) seems the best on average. It has a better relative performance in periods of low inflation and of hyperinflation and a worse performance in periods of high inflation. (S, s ) rules have a better relative performance at high inflation, a reasonable perfor mance at low inflation, but they perform poorly during hyperinfla tion. This provides some preliminary evidence in favor of the view (in Leijonhulfvud.1991 , Heiner 1983 and Heymann and Leijonhulfvud 1993 that as the macreconomic environment becomes very complex (extreme price instability) simpler expectation-formation rules start performing relatively better than more sophisticated rules based on economic models. In the context of equilibrium models of imperfect price informa tion with intertemporal purchases, such as those in Benabou (1993) , Fishman and Rob (1991), iVIcMillan and Morgan (1988) , and Tom masi (1994), one very important parameter is the duration of real prices -the number of periods that a real price is below a particular threshold. Fishman and Rob (1991) and Tommasi (1994) show that consumer welfare and economic efficiency are increasing in that du ration. The same result is obtained by Ball and Romer (1992) 
The intuition is as follows. Imagine a consumer who buys a particular product once a week. In a context of unchanging real prices, the buyer will search for an adequate supplier (defined by a reservation acceptance price) the first time, and stick to purchasing there forever. In a changing environment, it is optimal (under some conditions) to set a reservation acceptance price and keep purchasing from the same supplier as long as his real price is below that threshold. An increase in real price instability harms consumers by lowering the value of the information they have costly acquired. The equilibrium implications of price instability are lower consumer welfare and a less effective selection of adequate trading partners.
To provide some evidence on price durability, I computed the number of consecutive weeks in which each real price is below a certain threshold. I did so far several thresholds, I report here the average number of weeks each price is below the product mean. Since these durations are dependend on length of the sample due to trun cation, I restrict the analysis to the three longer comparable periods: the first and last 30 weeks of the 1990 sample (notice they overlap), and the 30 weeks of the 1992 sample.
These averages, for each product/store are reported in Table A4 . Table 8 reports the store averages, as well as overall averages for each of the three periods. The durability of real prices is decreasing in inflation. For in stance, if you found a good price (below average), it is likely to last for about 5 weeks if you are in the low-inflation regime, while it will last for just about a week if you are in the high-inflation regime. 1 :) This could have important costs as emphasized in the search-theoretic literature.
It is worth noting that, as explained below, part of the variability in low inflation times comes from the presence of mark-down sales. It is likely that these sales (1) represent a benefit to consumers and (2) are advertised in such a way that price information (in low-inflation times) is even better than reflected by these numbers.
Mark-down sales.
There is an old (vague) theme going' back to Ohm (1975 and 1981) and Carlton (1982) : "inflation has Industrial Organization ef fects" . High inflation introduces several distortions in the way firms conduct business (see the accounts in Heymann and Leijonhulfvud 1993 and references there). One oItha most noticeable effects of post stabilization price stability in a country like Argentina, is the appear ance of mark-down sales, catalogs, price advertising, and credit plans 1:3 Notice that the tnmcatioll of the series is likely to Lias uowll\varu the estimates of umatioll particularly for perious of longer ulll'atiolls (lower il1Hation). So that true Jurations wiIl likeJy Lc longer than 5 weeks in the low-il1Hation regime.
for the purchase of consumer durables (De Gregorio, Guidotti and Vegh, 1993) . Practices that are taken for granted in countries like the U.S. or Canada, are a "luxury" of low-inflation times in Argentina. In this section, I provide some preliminary evidence on one of those effects.
The sample we use states when the reported quotation is claimed to be "on sale" . As a check, I verified that in almost all of the cases (more than 90% of the time) the reported prices represented the minimum prices in their cross-sections and also nominal price decreases from their previous level. Figure 2 shows the number of sales, together with the weekly in flation rate for the sample. There are no sales during high-inflation episodes and they reappear with "stability" . Possible explanations are that: (1) announcing Pi .. i provides little information if P is un known, and (2) it is very hard to compromise the maintenance of a nominal price for a long enough period to make a "sale" feasible. 16
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Insofar as the practice of mark-downs is welfare-improving for buyers (and sellers) , we have an additional instance where inflation alters the transaction technology and hence diminishes welfare.
Conclusion.
Paul Krugman has argued that economics has a dirty little se cret: We don't know why inflation is costly. This paper provides microeconomic evidence that sheds some light on the mechanisms by which real world inflations affect the heart of market economies: the price system. The evidence suggests that the informational content of real prices diminishes with inflation. Recent (and old) literature argues that the instability of real prices has efficiency costs.
This work needs to be extended in several directions. First, we did not attempt here any explanation of the findings. IV10re theo retical (and more theoretically-grounded empirical) work is needed. Also, our sample is relatively small and un-representative. Broader coverage and similar studies with data from other countries -with different inflationary experiences -are necessary. 16 I am indeuted to a referee of this Review for pointing out that a third posssibility is that at high inl'iatioll, the (S) S ) Land widens ill snch a way that cllstomers with low cost of search call be "ofleret! low prices" without official mark-downs. 
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